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Abstract
A new emerging paradigm of Uncertain Risk of Suspi-
cion, Threat and Danger, observed across the field of in-
formation security, is described. Based on this paradigm
a novel approach to anomaly detection is presented. Our
approach is based on a simple yet powerful analogy from
the innate part of the human immune system, the Toll-Like
Receptors. We argue that such receptors incorporated as
part of an anomaly detector enhance the detector’s ability
to distinguish normal and anomalous behaviour. In addi-
tion we propose that Toll-Like Receptors enable the classi-
fication of detected anomalies based on the types of attacks
that perpetrate the anomalous behaviour. Classification of
such type is either missing in existing literature or is not fit
for the purpose of reducing the burden of an administrator
of an intrusion detection system. For our model to work, we
propose the creation of a taxonomy of the digital Acytota,
based on which our receptors are created.
1 The State of Affairs
Signature and anomaly based intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS) have been around for many years, yet repeat-
edly have encountered the same pitfalls over and over again.
This issue has been raised in the past, notably by Gates and
Taylor [4] who challenged the idea of network based ano-
maly detection systems. Gates’ and Taylor’s account of the
problem focuses mainly on anomaly detection in the net-
work environment, however the area of host based intru-
sion detection, be it signature or anomaly based, exhibit
analogous issues. Systems which combine these two ap-
proaches are sparse, let alone successful at attracting the
security community to pursue the mixed approach further.
We argue that such approach has so far been unsuccessful
due to the way the fusion of the approaches was tackled.
One of the most counter-productive failings of existing
IDS systems is the enduring presence of false positive alerts.
This problem is aggravated even more with the sheer vol-
ume of such alerts. In anomaly based detection systems this
is often due to the lack of re-training and re-calibration of
detectors especially in unstable environments. These high
volumes result in the difficulty of analysing logs produced
by intrusion detection systems. Various forms of visuali-
sation exist that attempt to solve this issue, however with
little success [11]. Gates and Taylor [4] propose a classifi-
cation of detected anomalies based on the type of attack that
caused them in order for an IDS administrator to be able to
prioritise and deal with most serious threats first. We pro-
pose that the incorporation of our immunological analogy
enables anomaly classification at a level suitable for such
prioritisation.
A seemingly simple part of the innate immune system
that only recently began its research journey by immunol-
ogists has been our vital inspiration. This is the area of
Pathogen Associated Molecular Patterns (PAMP) and Toll
Like Receptors (TLR) in particular [3]. After some study
of the security field, the authors realised that numerous re-
searchers have presented ideas that support our proposed
model, or that add functionality to form a more coherent
whole outlining a paradigm worth investigating. We call
this paradigm UR-STD.
2 The Uncertain Risk of STD
In 1994 Polly Matzinger shook the world of immunology
with her controversial model of how the immune system op-
erates [7]. Her view divided the immunological community
which until this day segregates itself into classical immunol-
ogy, the Danger model and immunologists who don’t clas-
sify themselves into any of the aforementioned camps. In
Matzinger’s model, danger is defined as follows [7]:
• Danger - the total damage to cells indicated by distress
signals that are sent out when cells die an unnatural
death
The authors cannot determine if the shift in immunology
from a concrete deterministic concept of self/non-self to a
less concrete danger model had an effect on the thinking
within the field of computer science, however a brief scan
through research into new paradigms reveals a number of
related approaches to computer security. Hollebeek’s paper
[5] on the role of suspicion in model based IDS gives a fas-
cinating account of two new concepts of suspicion and un-
certainty. These are introduced as part of a forensic anal-
ysis model that employs such new ways of thinking about
what could constitute malicious behaviour in post-analysis.
His definitions are as follows [5]:
• Suspicion - likelihood that a given event or pattern of
events is evidence of malicious behaviour
• Uncertainty - likelihood that deductions are correct
and the likelihood the observed behaviour is normal
under the assumption that no malicious behaviour is
present
A number of points from Hollebeek’s work are comple-
menting the thesis of this paper. Firstly the fact that in foren-
sic analysis an analyst only needs a few clues in order to
recognise an intrusion. This approach works well from a
forensics point of view rather than anomaly detection, how-
ever as will be shown in Section 6.2, this does not have to
be the case. Secondly a concept which is paramount to the
Danger model by Matzinger, the notion of context, as be-
ing a vital part of an IDS. Hollebeek does not associate his
views with immunology or the Danger model. The assump-
tion therefore might be that an investigation of Matzinger’s
model might provide some additional inspiration, which can
teach us something applicable to IDS.
Besides the already mentioned new metrics, Saydjari
proposed a new measure for system security, Risk [13]. An-
other term, originally classified more as a subjective mea-
sure, nevertheless presented by Saydjari with all the quali-
ties of a good metric. His definition is as follows [13]:
• Risk - risk of an event happening is the probability of
that event happening multiplied by the consequences
(damage or loss) from that event
• Overall Risk - the sum of the risk of all the bad
events(failures) that can be induced by a malicious at-
tacker on an information system
Last but not least the term threat, which has been used
in information security for decades, only now beginning to
stand as a valid measure in its own right. Sahinoglu for
example defines threat in his model in the following way
[12]:
• Threat - the probability of the exploitation of some
vulnerability or weakness within a specific time frame.
We propose that a new paradigm is emerging in exist-
ing literature. This paradigm moves away from traditional
forms of measures from quantifiably objective to seemingly
more subjective ones. We call this the Uncertain Risk of
Suspicion, Threat and Danger paradigm.
In the remainder of our paper we will present a new ap-
proach to intrusion detection closely tied to the newly de-
fined UR-STD paradigm, particularly to the notion of dan-
ger, based on Matzinger’s model, suspicion by Hollebeek
and a more general notion of threat.
3 PAMPing up Anomaly Detection
As proposed by Matzinger’s model and many subsequent
research works undertaken by immunologists, pathogen as-
sociated molecular patterns and their detectors play a vital
role in detecting danger in the human body. One such type
of PAMP detectors are Toll-Like Receptors which are de-
scribed in more detail in Section 4. This paper proposes
that PAMP receptors are a necessary extension to current
anomaly detection techniques in order to obtain results from
our systems that go beyond what has been achieved in both
anomaly and signature based detection fields. Hollebeek
[5] confirms this view, arguing that in forensics, an analyst
does not analyse data in a naive way. In other words he can-
not analyse data without knowing about what he is looking
for. We suggest that receptors, such as TLRs are missing.
As John McHugh stated in his work on locality, the under-
standing of our systems with which we work is necessary to
the degree, which will allow us to identify necessary parts of
malicious activities [9]. Surprisingly McHugh’s intentions
portray the functionality of TLRs in the human immune sys-
tem very well.
3.1 Signatures and Anomalies
Gates’ provocative discussion on the anomaly detection
paradigm in the networking environment [4] points out a
number of disparities between Denning’s seminal paper on
anomaly detection [2] and the way her model is used by
many security researchers. Anomaly based detection is not
performing as we would like and thus we could assume
either that its concept is applied incorrectly, it is missing
something or both. Anomaly detection is missing that little
extra knowledge that forensic analysts have in mind when
looking for clues in data logs or when Agatha Christie’s
famous Belgian detective Poirot is solving a murder mys-
tery. This missing knowledge is what Hollebeek wonder-
fully termed as ‘smelling the rat’ without a ‘smoking gun’
[5]. In our proposed model anomalous behaviour is not ma-
licious. We suggest that malicious behaviour exhibits cer-
tain features, analogous to biological malignant objects, that
it cannot occur without, much like viruses/bacteria. This is
especially true when diversity is a factor in terms of ob-
served attributes of a system. Such unique features are the
extra knowledge that we need in order to distinguish be-
tween anomalous and malicious behaviour. TLRs are the
proposed way of storing and sensing such features when
they occur. In order to obtain the necessary information
about such features we propose the creation of a taxonomy
of the digital Acytota as described in Section 5.
4 Toll-Like Receptors
Paramount to our model is the notion of lower level, low
volume receptors, which detect by-products of malicious
activity. Such receptors exist in the human body in the form
of Toll-Like Receptors. In the following section we will in-
troduce these structures and draw an analogy to computer
security.
4.1 Function
Toll-like receptors are a set of receptors on the surface
of immune cells, which act as sensors to foreign microbial
products, more broadly described as PAMPs. Up to this
date around twelve TLRs have been discovered in the hu-
man body, each of them sensing a specific protein or a set
of proteins discharged by viruses and bacteria. These mi-
crobial products are of essential nature to the existence and
function of the foreign entities, thus making it impossible
for the bacteria and viruses to adapt and evade these recep-
tors. A simple definition of TLRs is that they are the initial
line of defence against pathogens attacking a system. They
sound an alarm when they encounter certain virus or bac-
teria specific chemicals, which trigger a cascade of events
potentially resulting in an immune response. One can think
of these receptors as piano keys. A different sound is played
when a different key or combination of keys is pressed at
once. TLRs can be categorised based on their specializa-
tion. TLRs 1,2,4,5 and 6 mainly specialise in bacterial prod-
ucts, whereas TLRs 3,7,8 and 9 specialise in the detection
of virus specific by-products and nucleic acids. This func-
tionality of TLRs is a feature which is in many ways anal-
ogous to some problems computer security. The fact that
different combinations of activated TLRs perform different
actions make it possible for the idea to be used in a multi-
dimensional environment such as intrusion detection.
4.2 Analogy
From the description of the functionality of TLRs, one
can see that such receptors lend themselves to the missing
component of anomaly detection. This is due to their sim-
plicity yet powerful functionality. One can argue that in the
human body TLRs detect ligands which are produced by
parts of malignant entities which are not subject to muta-
tion. This is very different from the nature of digital mali-
cious entities which can mutate or morph between versions
or even on their own (e.g. polymorphic virus). However
we argue that due to the deterministic nature of machines
the creation of a taxonomy of the digital Acytota should be
possible, which at some level is representative of the mali-
cious entities digital systems encounter. Such a taxonomy
will have to evolve over time at some level, however this
will be incomparable in terms of frequency and volume to
the level at which current signature based systems are up-
dated.
To enforce our argument for TLRs as the correct candi-
date for our analogy, we look back at Hollebeek’s work. In
his paper, an overall suspicion in his model is described as
‘a function of the degree to which each resource, event, or
inference is suspicious and the number of independent rea-
sons we have for being suspicious of it’ [5]. Here we can
see a clear parallel with the functionality of TLRs. Given
that each resource, event and possibly an inference holds a
set of TLRs, we can obtain a measure of suspicion, which
together with existing anomaly based systems can give us a
more decisive view of what is happening.
5 Towards a Taxonomy of the Digital Acytota
In order to be able to employ the functionality of TLRs
in intrusion detection systems, we need to develop a taxon-
omy of the digital malicious world. This is a pre-requisite,
without which the proposed model becomes less effective.
Such a taxonomy would not only allow us to implement the
notion of TLRs fully, but would also allow us to classify
detected malicious activities based on their type. One exist-
ing analysis of system calls in terms of their threat level and
class of possible malicious activity has been proposed by
Bernaschi in [1]. He classified system calls into four differ-
ent threat levels, based on what kind of attack they are most
likely to be used for, and nine groups of system function-
ality. For example Bernaschi classified system calls open,
mount and link, among others, as belonging to threat level
group 1, which represents system calls generally used for
attacks that allow for the full control of a system.
Examination of various other components, levels and ab-
stractions within computer systems is desirable in order to
obtain a more complete picture of the TLR like features that
are exhibited by malicious entities. We can start by exam-
ining existing works of research, followed by our own anal-
ysis of the digital Acytota. In current literature we can find
work which contains some useful information from this per-
spective. For example McHugh’s [9] work on locality con-
tains description of features that are present in locality in-
formation unique to certain types of malicious network ac-
tivities. McHugh uses the aggressive network behaviour of
a Code Red or SQL/Slammer as an example, which corre-
sponds to our desired, seemingly unique features. Another
candidate is the set of system call arguments. These exhibit
numerous features which can be considered unique to at-
tacks. We can also clearly define what types of system call
arguments can present a higher risk to a system. For exam-
ple an argument which contains the reference to the passwd
file under the Unix OS can be potentially much more haz-
ardous than a reference to a word processing document in
a user’s home directory. The inclusion of system call argu-
ments in our TLR model should also ensure the detection of
mimicry attacks.
6 Proof of Concept
In order to evaluate our model, we have developed a sys-
tem which incorporates the afore-described model. This
system was constructed by observing the human immune
system and while maintaining some aspects of the biologi-
cal functionality, the immune system was largely an inspira-
tion rather than a guide. For the anomaly detector which in-
corporates TLRs, Kohonen’s Self-Organising Maps (SOM)
[6] have been used, due to their similarity to the role of tis-
sue in the human body. Further justifications for the use of
SOMs are described in the following section.
6.1 SOMs as a Somatic model
The idea of self-organising networks comes as an ideal
analogy to an environment within which TLRs exist in the
human body, tissue. This is based on their similar behaviour
and functionality. Both self-organising networks and tissue
have nodes/cells, which dynamically change based on the
situation they are in. SOM networks adapt to data which is
passed through them and in human tissue, cells die and new
ones are created as the body needs them.
One such type of self-organising networks are the afore-
mentioned Kohonen’s self-organising maps (SOM) [6]. Ko-
honen’s SOM is an algorithm which allows the input of
highly multi-dimensional data which is reduced to a pre-
defined smaller dimensionality in order to represent such
complex data in a more understandable manner for both
human and machine. It organises the input data within a
low-dimensional map, based on the similarity between the
incoming data items and items already present in the map.
In this way, the algorithm automatically organises and puts
similar data items in topologically close proximity of each
other within the generated map.
This self-organisation presents a number of parallels be-
tween the digital and a biological system. Such as the fa-
cilitation of a possible localisation function based on the
topological proximity of neighbouring nodes within a SOM
[10], possibly of interest to the research on locality [9].
Figure 1. TLR implementation within a SOM
The ability of self-organising network algorithms such
as Kohonen’s SOM allow us to experiment and take into
account the issues of diversity [8] with little difficulty. As
will be shown in Section 6.3, the ability to monitor a large
variety as well as only few aspects of the monitored system,
provide an ideal environment for TLR implementation.
6.2 Implementation of TLRs
In our system, the implementation of TLRs is achieved
by the creation of a table structure for every node within a
SOM. We have taken Bernaschi’s [1] system call threat level
categorisation and experimented with threat level 1 group.
This means system calls used in attacks which allow for the
full control of a system. These 23 system calls are used
in our model as one TLR, which each SOM node exhibits.
Figure 1 shows the TLR model within the SOM context.
Kohonen’s SOM algorithm, just like any other unsuper-
vised learning algorithm, comprises of two steps. Training
and detection. The role of TLRs in training is different from
detection. The SOM, besides being trained on various sys-
tem signals described below, learns the PAMPs encountered
during training. In our implementations PAMPs are simply
system calls which have been called during a time frame
that is represented by an incoming node (data vector). The
algorithm initially starts with random values assigned to the
maps node’s weight values, as proposed by Kohonen. The
TLR data structure, as seen in Figure 1, is initialised for
each node within the SOM map with a value for the Trig-
gered field as 0, meaning false. During training the map
learns according to the standard SOM algorithm, with the
additional functionality of activation of TLRs when relevant
PAMPs are encountered. This activation occurs when in-
coming nodes on which the SOM is trained present PAMPs
which the SOM node’s TLRs bind to.
Incoming nodes into the SOM are our input feature vec-
tors (IFVs). These comprise of the monitored features of
the system in question. In our experimental setup, the IFVs
constitute of 14 different process specific measures, such
as CPU usage, memory usage and other host based met-
rics. For more information regarding the data used in our
experiment see Section 6.3.1. As can be seen in Figure 1,
PAMPs presented by IFVs are stored in a similar data struc-
ture as TLRs on nodes within the SOM. Once the SOM al-
gorithm determines the winning node for the currently ob-
served IFV, we simply trigger its TLRs depending on the
presented PAMPs. This way we train our SOM not only
on the IFV data but also on the specific features that are
observable during normal operation of the monitored sys-
tem/resource (i.e. a monitored process in our case). Once
our SOM is trained, this represents a reduced representation
of normal behaviour of the monitored system/resource.
In the detection stage, rather than adjusting the SOM
map further, we simply find the Best Matching Unit (BMU)
for the currently presented IFV and calculate their simi-
larity. At the same time our system monitors if the cur-
rently observed IFV presents a PAMP. If it does, then the
algorithm checks which TLRs of the BMU have been trig-
gered during training. If the IFV presents PAMPs which
were present during training, than we assume that their pres-
ence is justified, thus nothing additional happens. We might
however retain the information holding the total number of
triggered TLRs which were encountered during training for
purposes yet to be investigated (e.g. SOM evolution). On
the other hand if PAMPs are encountered which have not
been detected during training, then our TLR activation level
increases. This activation level is a measure of suspicious
activity on its own, however we can use it to amend the
result of the overall BMU distance measure, which is a rep-
resentation of how anomalous a monitored IFV is. Thus
making an IFV which presents a large number of PAMPs,
not encountered during training, more anomalous and suspi-
cious than an IFV which does not present any PAMPs. The
effect of this action is to be further investigated and tested
to fully appreciate its possibilities and correctness.
Using this model we argue that we are able to achieve
what Hollebeek [5] proposed in his paper for forensics anal-
ysis. Yet we are looking to achieve this for real-time IDS.
His point of view that an analyst only needs a few clues
to recognise an intrusion becomes viable with the use of
TLR’s. Incompleteness as a necessary characteristic of the
model is also pertinent in our case.
We further argue that the diversity of IFV’s with the ad-
dition of TLR’s offers a view of a context within which ma-
licious activities are detected, which inevitably is a vital part
of an IDS [5]. This leads onto another vital capability of our
system, which has not been implemented as of yet, however
it is expected to be realised in the foreseeable future. This is
the ability to classify detected anomalies based on the type
of attack that most likely caused them. In our model this
is to be implemented by assigning individual TLRs to a set
of features which, as defined in our taxonomy of Acytota,
represent a certain class of attacks. For example a recep-
tor called TLR1 will detect any PAMPs that are associated
with denial of service attacks. For such attacks we already
have a set of commonly used system calls as suggested by
Bernaschi [1]. Other unique features that could belong to
this receptor are for example specific types of IRC com-
munication sequences exhibited by bots. Once our model
contains a set of TLRs, each representing a class of attacks,
we can incorporate various metrics from our UR-STD pa-
radigm. For example we can define a measure of uncer-
tainty, which depends on the proportion of activated TLRs
and the total TLR activation level per SOM node. This will
then provide us with a level of confidence showing to what
degree a detected anomaly belongs to the chosen class of
attacks. The choice of what class an anomaly belongs to
is determined based on which TLR had the highest activa-
tion level. Additionally the calculation of risk of a particu-
lar type of anomaly, based on its classification is a possible
candidate for further investigation.
The role of suspicion in our model is another metrics
that can be used to make assumptions about the overall be-
haviour of the monitored system. For example we use it to
denote the total number of IFVs which present at least one
PAMP to the SOM which has not been encountered during
training. Thus we can obtain a measure of how suspicious a
session or a window of events is. This measure is described
in Section 6.3.3.
6.3 Experimental Design
As mentioned previously, our experimental setup is
mainly for illustrative purposes. It is yet to be statisti-
cally validated and further explored, however it provides a
demonstration of our proposed TLR model with some ini-
tial results.
6.3.1 Data
We have tested our model on a set of real data, based on the
work of Twycross [14]. The data comprises of 55 sessions
of normal behaviour and 5 attack sessions (4 sessions of a
wuftpd vulnerability exploit and 1 nmap scan session). The
session logs were generated using a process monitor, which
samples various process specific information at a regular in-
terval and system call information generated by the standard
Unix tool called strace. A total number of 14 features have
been observed using process monitor at any point in time,
giving us a diverse coverage of the monitored system. For
more information regarding the dataset please refer to [14].
6.3.2 SOM parameters
A large number of parameters exists as part of the standard
Kohonen’s SOM algorithm. For our system we have chosen
a set of parameters which have been statistically shown to
be appropriate for a scenario such as our. These can be seen
in Table 1. These parameters are a vital part of the anomaly
detector and thus their thorough examination is a topic of
future research.
Table 1. SOM parameters
Parameter Value
SOM Size 15
Iterations 4
Initial Learning Rate 0.9
Neighbourhood Function squared
Neighbourhood Size 15/2
One parameter which is used in our system that does not
conform to the basic SOM algorithm is the use of a distance
metrics other than Euclidean. A normalisation percentage
metrics is used due to the fact that the data used in our ex-
periments is not normalised at the pre-processing stage. The
formula used for calculating this BMU % distance measure
is shown below:
∑
Min(BMU,IFV )/(Max(BMU,IFV )/100)
No.ofDimensions
This measure gives us a clearer indication of the similar-
ity between the tested IFVs and the trained SOM.
The system calls used as TLRs in our model are as fol-
lows: open, link, unlink, chmod, lchown, rename, fchown,
chown, mknod, mount, symlink, fchmod, execve, setgid, se-
treuid, setregid, setgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, setresuid, se-
tresgid, setuid, init module. As stated earlier they are threat
level 1 group from Bernaschi’s work [1].
The SOM was trained on 7 normal sessions, chosen at
random from the existing 55 sessions. The sessions used for
training are as follows: 2, 10, 14, 24, 35, 41, 57. Following
the training session, the SOM was tested against a subset of
the normal sessions not used during training and against all
attack sessions.
6.3.3 Results
Our initial experiments have produced the following
promising results. In Figure 2 we can see the result of the
BMU % distance measure for a subset of our tested nor-
mal sessions. From the graph we can see that the major-
ity of IFVs belonging to the tested normal sessions have a
percentage difference from the BMU in the range between
0 and 20%. Some false negatives in terms of BMU dis-
tance measure would be generated, depending on the cho-
sen threshold for what percentage difference is classified as
anomalous IFVs. Nevertheless if the threshold is set to 50%,
then only a handful of IFVs are above such threshold and
they belong to a small subset of tested sessions. It is cor-
rect to assume that by tweaking the SOM parameters and
using a more precise BMU distance measure, these anoma-
lous IFVs could be reduced even further.
Comparing Figure 2 to Figure 3, we can clearly see that
the BMU % distance measure for the majority of tested
Figure 2. BMU distance - normal sessions
Figure 3. BMU distance - attack sessions
IFVs has on average increased. Also the number and spread
of anomalous IFVs has increased and is present in all attack
sessions. The session which produced the largest amounts
of anomalous IFVs with a BMU distance of 50% and above
is session 4 which is the nmap scan. This is possibly due
to the fact that the nmap is a separate application from the
one which is exploited by the wuftpd exploit. Thus session
4 produces more system calls and, as will be seen in Figure
4, a higher TLR activation level.
Figure 4 shows the levels of TLR activation across all
tested sessions. It also shows the number of suspicious
nodes (IFVs). TLR activation is the total number of TLRs
which have been triggered during detection but not during
training. An IFV can present up to 23 PAMPs, each of
which, if presented, adds to the TLR activation level count.
All attack sessions exhibit larger TLR activation levels in
comparison to normal sessions. Session 4 exhibits a signif-
icantly higher TLR activation level, possibly due to the dif-
ferent composition of the underlying application. One could
argue that the higher value of TLR activation for attack ses-
sions is due to attack sessions containing larger amounts of
IFVs. This might be the case and is currently under inves-
tigation, however it is assumed that using a larger diversity
of TLRs, as proposed by the creation of a taxonomy of ma-
Figure 4. TLR activation level
licious entities, and with a corresponding dataset the TLR
activation level results will be of more representative na-
ture.
One could argue that the difference between the BMU
% distance of the normal and the attack sessions is not sig-
nificant enough on its own, however when we look at the
TLR activation levels as shown in Figure 4, we can see that
there is a clear distinction between normal and attack ses-
sions. We argue that further investigation of the SOM pa-
rameters will produce better results, at a level comparable
or possibly higher than existing implementations of SOM
based IDS systems. Once we correlate the results of BMU
% distance with the TLR activation level we have a clear
distinction between normal sessions and sessions that ex-
hibit malicious behaviour.
7 Conclusion
The proposed Uncertain Risk of Suspicion, Threat
and Danger paradigm points out to the information secu-
rity field’s tendency to increasingly incorporate, originally
rather subjective, measures as part of security solutions. We
suggest that the use of such measures can have a positive
impact on the manageability of the outcome of intrusion
detection systems, especially from an administrator’s point
of view. The incorporation of some of the proposed mea-
sures in the form of biologically inspired receptors as part
of an existing anomaly detection technique shows promis-
ing results and points to the direction that such receptors
might possibly be one of the missing links for successful
anomaly detection in intrusion detection systems. Our view
is that TLR’s inclusion not only enhances the detection ca-
pability of anomaly detectors but also provides additional
functionality by means of vital anomaly classification. The
diverse nature of monitored features with the incorporated
TLR functionality should also allow for the detection of,
traditionally difficult to detect, attacks, such as race con-
ditions and mimicry attacks. Further exploration of TLRs,
their levels and their role as a classification mechanism is to
be conducted in future research. The incorporation of fur-
ther parts of the UR-STD paradigm are also to be investi-
gated in order to exploit all the possibilities of the proposed
paradigm.
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